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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO PRIVACY-
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
On October 4, 1971, defendant, Jerald North, allegedly kid-
napped a young school girl, dragging her into his car at knifepoint.
Investigation by police led to his arrest and incarceration the fol-
lowing day. North's wife visited the jail on October 6 and was
allowed to meet with her husband in the arresting officer's office.
After the detective left the room and closed the door behind him,
the couple engaged in a five minute conversation that was recorded
without their knowledge or consent. The recording was presented
as evidence at the preliminary hearing. Following his arraignment,
the defendant moved to suppress this and other evidence which
had been obtained without a warrant.' His motion was denied.
North then brought a mandamus proceeding for review of the
court's denial. Held, writ of mandamus issued. A divided Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the officers' "search" of North's con-
versation with his wife was unlawful, since, under the circumstan-
ces, he had "a reasonable expectation his conversation was, and
would remain, private."'2 North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301,
502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972).
Three months later, the California Supreme Court had a
chance to reevaluate its reasoning in North. A divided court this
time affirmed a juvenile court's refusal to suppress evidence of a
conversation similarly monitored and recorded. This communica-
tion between an infant defendant and his uncle occurred in a police
interrogation room. During the conversation, the defendant admit-
ted having stabbed the victim. The court distinguished North by
stressing that the eavesdropping there was on a special communi-
cation between a husband and wife that the police had represented
'The car allegedly used by North in the kidnapping was parked on a public
street near his home. Contemporaneously with the arrest, the police seized and
examined the car without a search warrant. North argued that such an examination
constituted an unreasonable search of his property. Since additional evidence con-
necting North with the kidnapping resulted from this search, he moved to suppress
this evidence. The Supreme Court of California denied the motion, stating that
"warrantless seizures of evidentiary items in plain view of arresting officers" are
lawful. North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 308, 502 P.2d 1305, 1309, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 833, 837 (1972).
2Id. at 312, 502 P.2d at 1312, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
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would be confidential. Here, however, the juvenile defendant had
no "reasonable expectation" that his conversation would be pri-
vate.3 In re A., 30 Cal. App. 3d 880, 106 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1973).
Both In re A. and North apply a reasonable expectation of
privacy test. The mere existence of the test reflects the broad de-
velopment of fourth amendment4 protection against unreasonable
governmental intrusions, particularly in the area of electronic
eavesdropping.5 Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Katz
v. United States," upon which the North decision strongly relied,
first proposed the test. He listed two requirements for determining
a right of privacy 7-"first that a person have exhibited an actual
3In re A., 30 Cal. App. 3d 880, 886, 106 Cal. Rptr. 729, 733 (1973). The reasons
for the distinction are more fully explained later in this comment. As will be shown,
the California court looked to the surrounding facts in each case to determine the
reasonableness of expecting privacy.
'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment protects individuals against unlaw-
ful acts by federal officials. By virtue of the fourteenth amendment, the protection
extends to unreasonable searches and seizures by state officials. Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), the Supreme Court
stated that "the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police
is .. .implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause" of the fourteenth amendment.
For purposes of this article, the term fourth amendment will be used to include the
protection afforded an individual against unlawful governmental (i.e., state or fed-
eral) intrusions.
5Generally, the law recognizes two types of communications that can be elec-
tronically monitored. One is an oral communication which is normally tape-
recorded. The other is a wire communication which is usually made over a tele-
phone and intercepted by a method commonly referred to as wiretapping. In North
and In re A., the conversations involved were oral communications. This comment
will focus on oral communications and their relationship to the protection afforded
by the fourth amendment.
1389 U.S. 347 (1967).
'A right of privacy is not expressly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Yet, the
Supreme Court has deemed it to be a fundamental right equal in significance to
the enumerated rights. Justice Douglas, in his opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), explained that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance." While various facets of privacy are contained in several of the
first ten amendments, the fourth amendment alone has been considered to create
a penumbral "right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and
particularly reserved to the people." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
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(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expecta-
tion be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "I
Originally, the fourth amendment was applied strictly to pro-
tect individuals only against unreasonable physical trespass to
their person or property. The Supreme Court, in Olmstead v.
United Stdtes, determined that wiretapping did not violate the
fourth amendment because it did not constitute a physical entry
upon another's premises.9 For the same reason, the Court, in
Goldman v. United States, decided that the use of a detectaphone
to eavesdrop upon an oral communication was not unlawful."
After Silverman v. United States," it became apparent that the
requirement of physical trespass was neither legitimate nor practi-
cal. In Silverman, the electronic device used was forced through
the defendants' wall until it touched the heating ducts. The Court
deemed this technical invasion a trespass and, thus, a violation of
the fourth amendment. In Goldman, the detectaphone was placed
on the wall of an adjoining room not belonging to the defendants.
Since there was no physical trespass, the evidence obtained was
held admissible. Yet, as Justice Douglas pointed out in his concur-
ring opinion, the application of the law rested on irrelevant facts.
Since the invasion of privacy was the same in each case, the rulings
should have been the same.
The Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States,"2 finally over-
ruled the Olmstead decision. The officers involved placed a device
inside a public telephone booth to record the defendant's end of a
conversation. In holding the tape-recording inadmissible, the
Court declared that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.' 13 Thus, protection depends neither upon whether a physi-
1389 U.S. at 361.
'277 U.S. 438 (1927). Government officials obtained evidence by means of a
wiretap against defendants who were conspiring to violate the Prohibition Act.
Since the tapping connections occurred in an office building on a public street and
not upon the defendants' property, the Court found no fourth amendment violation.
Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion, gave support to a broadening of the
protection guaranteed by the fourth amendment. He described the right of privacy
as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man."
He added that "every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government" upon a man's
privacy "must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 478.
0°316 U.S. 129 (1942). Although the Court refused to overrule Olmstead, there
was a strong minority in favor of doing so.
"365 U.S. 505 (1960).
12389 U.S. 347 (1967).
"Id. at 351.
[Vol. 76
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cal trespass has occurred nor upon where a person is located at the
time of the intrusion. Rather it turns on what an individual seeks
to preserve as private.'4 Justice Harlan concurred that the protec-
tion afforded by the fourth amendment concerned people, al-
though he described it in terms of place. He explained that the
primary issue is not whether, at other times, the telephone booth
"is accessible to the public." The question is whether the place is
"temporarily private," such that its periodic occupants can rea-
sonably expect to be alone and free from an intruding ear.'5
In a strong dissent in Katz, Justice Black objected to an overly
broad interpretation of the scope of the fourth amendment. Such
an interpretation, he believed, results in a judicial fabrication of a
constitutional right of privacy."6 Even the dissenting opinion in
North accepted without question the premise of an individual's
right of privacy. Justice Sullivan queried, however, how any defen-
dant confined in jail could reasonably expect to be alone.' Cer-
tainly, if one favors a strict application of the fourth amendment,
as did Justice Black, then the protection extended in North is
grossly beyond its legitimate scope. Given a broader view and Jus-
tice Harlan's reasonable expectation- of privacy test, however, the
protection afforded does not appear as nearly out of focus.
In Lanza v. United States," the Supreme Court had no need
to decide whether a recording of a conversation between two broth-
ers, one of whom was confined in jail, constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure. Yet, the dicta used in discussing the issue is
partly responsible for the opposite decisions in North and In re A.
On the one hand, the court asserted that "it may be assumed that
even in a jail, or perhaps especially there, the relationships which
the law has endowed with particularized confidentiality must con-
tinue to receive unceasing protection."" In North, the California
"Id.
"Id. at 361 (concurring opinion).
"Id. at 371 (dissenting opinion).
"18 Cal. 3d at 310, 502 P.2d at 1316, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 844 (dissenting opinion).
I370 U.S. 139 (1962). The petitioner, who had been given immunity from
prosecution, was convicted for refusing to answer questions presented by a fully
authorized legislative committee. A conversation between the petitioner and his
brother, who was confined in jail, had been intercepted. Petitioner argued that this
constituted an illegal search and seizure which violated the fourteenth amendment.
Consequently, he contended that he could not be compelled to answer any ques-
tions concerning the conversation. The Supreme Court held that it did not have to
decide the issue, since some of the questions which the petitioner was convicted for
refusing to answer were unrelated to the intercepted conversation.
"Id. at 143.
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court recognized a marital communication privilege,20 quoting the
above language.21 On the other hand, the Lanza court stated that
it was "at best a novel argument" to claim that one in jail was
protected by the fourth amendment, since "official surveillance
has traditionally been the order of the day." The In re A. court
adopted this reasoning to reach its conclusion.?
While the presence or absence of a confidential relationship in
the two California cases was important to their opposite holdings,
the reasonable expectation of privacy test was crucial. If the pri-
vacy of the defendants' conversations rested solely upon with
whom they had conversed, the test would be arbitrary and unfair.
The significance and merit of the reasonable expectation test is
that, in its application, it is not a test or formula at all. Reasona-
bleness can be determined only by reviewing fairly all the facts in
a given case and not by applying some arbitrary rule. In North, the
detective surrendered his own office, shut the door behind him,
and left North and his wife entirely alone. These facts led the
couple to expect, with justification, that their conversation would
be private.
In In re A., the police made no such implied representation
that the conversation would be private. The defendant and his
uncle conversed in an interrogation room rather than a detective's
private office. Furthermore, the defendant's uncle was aware of a
special mirror in the room through which the police could observe
them. In view of these particular facts, the California court held
that the defendant could not have reasonably expected his conver-
sation to be private.
As the court pointed out in In re A., the reasonable expecta-
tion test is consistent with recent federal legislation." In 1968,
Congress enacted a statute making the interception of any oral
communication illegal? and forbidding the introduction of such
2
°"[A] spouse . ..has a privilege during the marital relationship and after-
wards to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a communica-
tion if he claims the privilege and the communication was made in confidence
between him and the other spouse while they were husband and wife." CAL. EvIn.
CoDF § 980 (Deering 1965) (emphasis added).
218 Cal. 3d at 310, 502 P.2d at 1310, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 838 (1972).
2370 U.S. at 143.
2130 Cal. App. 3d at 884, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
2
"Id. at 883.
2 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, tit. 11, 18 U.S.C. § 2511
(1971).
[Vol. 76
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unlawfully obtained evidence in any trial. 6 Title II of the Act
defines oral communication as that "uttered by a person exhibit-
ing an expectation that such communication is not subject to in-
terception under circumstances justifying such expectation."
Thus, the requirement for a citizen's protection against the use of
warrantless recordings of oral conversations is the same under Title
III as under Justice Harlan's application of the fourth amend-
ment-a reasonable or justifiable expectation of privacy. 8
In addition to California, this test has also been used in the
federal courts. 21 It is likely to be applied in other state courts,
particularly in those states which, like West Virginia, have no
previously developed standard of conduct by way of legislation or
decision with regard to the interception of communications. The
West Virginia constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures.25 The provision is virtually identical to the fourth amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution and, according to the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals, should be construed in harmony
with it.2 ' West Virginia also recognizes the exclusionary rule. In
State v. Wills, 32 the West Virginia court declared that any evidence
2GId. § 2515.
21Id. § 2510 (emphasis added).21Although several federal courts have held Title III constitutional, the Su-
preme Court has not yet ruled on the question. One federal court recently held the
statute violative of the fourth amendment in certain circumstances. United States
v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Some commentators have raised
serious doubts about its constitutionality, e.g., Schwartz, The Legitimation of Elec-
tronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MICH. L. REV. 455
(1969). The most significant criticism of Title III came from Justice Douglas, who
deemed it unconstitutional in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Cox, 406
U.S. 934 (1973). Nevertheless, the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1971),
which defines oral communication, is not under attack. In fact, the criticism has
not been directed at a possible allowance of excessive protection of personal rights.
Rather, the fear is that Title I is likely to permit abusive eavesdropping upon
private conversations.
"United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972). A search of a prison
cell produced documentary evidence sufficient to prove the defendant guilty of tax
offenses. The court applied Justice Harlan's test and determined that the prisoner
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell.
.VA. CONST. art. I, § 6, provides:
The rights of the citizens to be secure in their houses, persons, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
No warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, or the per-
son or thing to be seized.
"State v. Duvernoy, 195 S.E.2d 631 (W. Va. 1973).
191 W. Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261 (1922).
6
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obtained by a search that violates the fourth amendment is inad-
missible in a trial against the accused. Moreover, the West Vir-
ginia Legislature enacted a law, in 1965, permitting a defendant
to suppress the use of illegally secured evidence.3 Generally
speaking then, West Virginia law on searches and seizures is com-
patible with federal law, and, as pointed out in State v. Abdella,3 '
great weight will be given to United States Supreme Court deci-
sions in interpreting the West Virginia constitution.
More specifically, with respect to confidential communica-
tions between spouses, West Virginia, by statute," forbids the
admission of testimony in a court of law by one spouse without the
consent of the other. This statute is narrower in scope than the
California law, which gives a spouse the "privilege. . . to prevent
another [person] from disclosing" a marital conversation made in
confidence.3 1 In fact, the West Virginia court ruled on this very
issue in Nash v. Insurance Co.3" The court held that, despite the
couple's intention that their conversation be private, "a third per-
son who overheard it, whether his presence was known or not, may
testify as to what was said.31 8 The West Virginia court would be
unlikely to admit such evidence today if the "third person" is
actually a concealed tape recorder, intentionally placed near the
couple in order to eavesdrop.39 Upon this background of law in
'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1A-6 (1966), provides: "A person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure may move for the return of property and to suppress
from use as evidence anything so seized on the ground that (1) the property was
illegally seized without a warrant .... "
'1139 W. Va. 428, 82 S.E.2d 913 (1954).
-W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-4 (1966), provides:
Neither husband nor wife shall, without the consent of the other, be
examined in any case as to any confidential communication made by one
to the other while married, nor shall either be permitted, without such
consent, to reveal in testimony after the marriage relation ceases any such
communication made while the marriage existed.
West Virginia also recognizes an attorney-client privilege. State v. Fisher, 126 W.
Va. 117, 27 S.E.2d 581 (1943). Furthermore, in justice of the peace courts, West
Virginia renders not only a spouse or an attorney incompetent to testify, but also a
clergyman concerning any confession and a physician concerning any communica-
tion made by his patient. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-6-10 (1966).
'CAL.. EvID. CODE § 980 (Deering 1965).
'106 W. Va. 672, 146 S.E. 726 (1929).
'Id. at 676, 146 S.E. at 727.
"'Since Nash, the West Virginia court has recognized a right of privacy. In
Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 876, 105 S.E.2d 564, 568 (1958), it was described
as "an individual right that should be held inviolate. To hold otherwise, under
modern means of communication, hearing devices, photography, and other technol-
[Vol. 76
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West Virginia, cases similar to North and In re A. will be decided.
Should West Virginia embrace the reasonable expectation stan-
dard? Does the test exaggerate the rights of an individual and
neglect the legitimate interests of society? Although an individ-
ual's right to privacy is considered fundamental, the interest of the
state in convicting those guilty of serious felonies is certainly sub-
stantial.
Ideally, a law or a test which applies the law should balance
the interests of an individual with those of society. In Katz, the
Supreme Court rejected the rigid Olmstead rule and sought to
create a standard which would achieve this balance. Assuming a
broad view of the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court appears
to have been successful. With its focus on protecting people rather
than particular places, the Harlan test weighs both interests. It
considers the individual's intention that his conversation be pri-
vate and requires that his expectation be one which society recog-
nizes as reasonable.
Finally, it becomes apparent that the test is also logical. When
it is reasonable according to society's standard for a person to
expect his communications to be private, it is unreasonable for
society without due authorization to search or eavesdrop upon such
private communications. The converse is true as well.
J. Timothy DiPiero
ogical advancements, would effectively deny valuable rights and freedoms to the
individual."
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